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PRETEXTUAL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES: ALASKA’S FAILURE
TO ADOPT A STANDARD
SHARDUL DESAI
A decade has passed since the United States Supreme Court set an
objective standard for testing the legality of pretextual searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Due to the greater
protection of privacy under the Alaska Constitution, it is possible
that a stricter standard would prevail in Alaska. However, Alaska
courts have yet to address whether and under what circumstances
such searches are valid under the state constitution. In recent
cases involving pretextual searches and seizures the Alaska courts
have avoided the state constitutional question entirely and have
even applied the wrong standard under the Fourth Amendment.
This Note highlights the need for the courts to resolve definitively
whether the Alaska Constitution imposes a stricter standard
beyond that set by the Fourth Amendment; author argues that it
ultimately does not.

I. INTRODUCTION
“The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind
may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the King of England may not enter; 1all his force dares not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement.” – William Pitt

Freedom from government intrusion lies at the very
foundation of Western law and culture, and is one of our nation’s
most cherished freedoms. As the Alaska Supreme Court has
stated, “[c]ertainly the . . . guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is at the very core of the protections needed to
2
preserve democracy against the excesses of government.”

Copyright © 2006 by Shardul Desai.
1. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49–50 (1937).
2. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971).
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To deter unreasonable searches and seizures, evidence
collected by illegal means is generally inadmissible at trial.3
However, there is a good-faith exception to this rule: evidence
collected in an illegal search and seizure may nevertheless be
admissible if the officer reasonably believed, in good faith, that the
4
search was legal. This good-faith exception raises the issue of
whether a bad faith exclusionary principle may also exist. That is,
whether evidence obtained in an otherwise valid search can be
suppressed when an officer acted in bad faith. So-called pretextual
5
searches and seizures, or pretexts, fall into this category.
Pretexts occur when the police use a legal justification to make
a stop and conduct a search for an unrelated crime for which they
do not have the probable cause or the reasonable suspicion
6
necessary to support a stop. A common example, and the kind
most frequently litigated, is a vehicle stop for a minor traffic
violation when an officer subjectively desires to investigate
7
another, non-traffic-related crime. Because pervasive regulations
tend to preclude total compliance with traffic and safety laws,
allowing pretexts would seem to subject drivers to “unfettered
8
police discretion.” Such discretion would permit traffic stops
9
based on arbitrary or discriminatory characteristics. The New
York Court of Appeals indicated the reality of this situation: “We
are not unmindful of studies . . . which show that certain racial and
ethnic groups are disproportionately stopped by police officers, and
that those stops do not end in the discovery of a higher proportion
10
of contraband than in the cars of other groups.”
3. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 391–93 (1914).
4. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1983); see also Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984) (extending the Leon rule); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3
(4th ed. 2004) (providing an extended analysis on the Leon good-faith exception).
5. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4.
6. Many courts and commentators have defined the meaning of “pretext.”
The definition used here is a synthesis of some of the more common definitions.
See United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988)); People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d
638, 642 (N.Y. 2001); Jeffery M. Kaban, Note, Alaska, the Last Frontier of Privacy:
Using the State Constitution to Eliminate Pretextual Traffic Stops, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
1309, 1309 (2004); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (8th ed. 2004) (pretextual
arrest).
7. See Kaban, supra note 6, at 1309.
8. Cannon, 29 F.3d at 475 (quoting Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516).
9. Id.
10. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 644.
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In Whren v. United States,11 the Supreme Court determined
that pretexts are legal under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
12
The issue has never been addressed under the
Constitution.
Alaska Constitution. Since Whren, six cases in the Alaska Court of
Appeals have questioned the legality of pretexts under article I,
13
section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. In both Hamilton v. State
14
and Way v. State, the court of appeals avoided the issue by
15
narrowly defining pretexts. In Nease v. State, the court declined to
16
address the pretext question under the state constitution. Indeed,
the Nease court implicitly applied an obsolete standard—the
reasonable officer standard—to pretexts under the Fourth
Amendment, relying on a treatise published before the Whren
17
18
19
opinion. Finally, Olson v. State, Grohs v. State, and Marley v.
20
State all served to reaffirm the law established in Nease.
This Note argues that the Alaska Court of Appeals erred in
avoiding the pretext question under the Alaska Constitution and
implicitly and erroneously adopted the reasonable officer standard.
Further, a thorough analysis of pretexts under the Alaska
Constitution demonstrates that Alaska should adopt an objective
standard. Part II of this Note will discuss the adoption of, and the
rationale behind, the three approaches to pretexts: the objective
standard, the reasonable officer standard, and the subjective
standard. To accomplish this task, this section will provide a
general overview of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the
adoption in federal courts of the objective standard and the
reasonable officer standard. Finally, this section will discuss the
illegality of pretexts under the State of Washington’s constitution
and that state’s adoption of the subjective standard. Part III will
discuss pretextual search-and-seizure case law in Alaska. First, a
general overview of Alaska’s search-and-seizure law will provide
the framework within which pretexts can be discussed. This
overview will illustrate that the Alaska Constitution provides
broader privacy protection than the Federal Constitution. Next,
the section will discuss relevant case law related to pretexts as well
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Id. at 820.
59 P.3d 760, 766 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
100 P.3d 902, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
105 P.3d 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1148–50.
No. A-8595, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005).
118 P.3d 1080 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
No. A-9285, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80 (Alaska Ct. App. May 3, 2006).
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as the recent six cases that raised the pretext question under the
Alaska Constitution. Finally, Part IV will illustrate that the court
of appeals reached erroneous conclusions in Hamilton, Way, and
Nease. Furthermore, the discussion will reveal that regardless of
greater privacy protections of the Alaska Constitution, the relevant
Alaska case law supports the adoption of the objective standard.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRETEXT STANDARDS
A. Overview of Fourth Amendment Search-and-Seizure Law
The Fourth Amendment is the Constitution’s guarantor of
personal security. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing21 the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

The Supreme Court has stated that “the Fourth Amendment
22
protects people, not places.” An individual shall be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion wherever he may harbor a
23
A “seizure” under the
reasonable “expectation of privacy.”
Fourth Amendment occurs whenever an officer accosts an
24
individual and restrains his freedom to leave. Therefore, a traffic
25
stop, even for a brief period of time, constitutes a “seizure.”
Warrantless searches and seizures are “per se unreasonable”
unless they fall under one of the narrowly recognized exceptions to
26
the warrant requirement. Under these exceptions, there are three
categories of permissible warrantless automobile stops: (1) a search

21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
24. Id. at 16.
25. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The exceptions are: (1) searches of abandoned
property; (2) searches in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (3) searches, with probable
cause, to avoid destruction of a known seizable item; (4) searches, with probable
cause, of a movable vehicle; (5) inventory searches; (6) searches pursuant to
voluntary consent; (7) searches in the rendition of “emergency aid”; (8) Terry
‘reasonable suspicion’ investigatory stops; and (9) searches incident to an arrest.
Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 840–41 (Alaska 1975).

02__DESAI.DOC

2006]

1/10/2007 8:47 AM

PRETEXTUAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

239

of a motor vehicle based on probable cause;27 (2) an inventory
28
29
search; and (3) a Terry “reasonable suspicion” investigatory stop.
Because the expectation of privacy regarding one’s automobile
is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or place of
business, a less rigorous application of the Fourth Amendment
30
As a result, warrantless searches and seizures of
governs.
automobiles have been upheld in circumstances where they would
31
be illegal in a home or office. However, unfettered governmental
32
intrusion into an automobile is impermissible. To protect against
arbitrary stops, the Supreme Court requires that the
reasonableness of a warrantless automobile stop be evaluated
33
Thus, “the decision to stop an
under an objective standard.
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to
34
believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”
Warrantless automobile stops without probable cause are
35
unconstitutional unless they are routine inventory searches or
36
Terry investigatory stops. In South Dakota v. Opperman, a
37
vehicle illegally parked was towed to an impound lot. At the lot,
the officers conducted a routine inventory of the contents within
38
the car and found marijuana in the glove compartment. When the
owner came by to reclaim his car, he was arrested for possession of
39
illegal narcotics. Because of the less rigorous application of the
Fourth Amendment to automobiles, the Court found that a routine
inventory search to ensure safekeeping of the belongings within the
40
The Court held that since the inventory
car was reasonable.
search of impounded vehicles was standard practice, the search was
41
not a “pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.”

27. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 662–63.
28. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370–74 (1976).
29. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
30. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.
31. Id.
32. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
33. Id. at 654.
34. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (internal citations
omitted).
35. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662–63.
36. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
37. Id. at 365–66.
38. Id. at 366.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 368, 375.
41. Id. at 376.
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The final category of permissible automobile stops is the Terry
“reasonable suspicion” investigatory stop. In Terry v. Ohio,42 the
Supreme Court upheld an officer’s investigatory search and seizure
of an individual based on his “reasonable suspicion” that criminal
43
conduct was likely to occur. Two men had caught the eye of the
officer as they took turns walking down a street and peering into a
44
store window roughly a dozen times. Suspecting the two were
planning to rob the store, the officer stopped and questioned
45
When asked their names the individuals “mumbled
them.
46
something,” at which point the officer decided to frisk them. The
frisk revealed that the two individuals were carrying guns, and they
47
were subsequently arrested for carrying concealed weapons.
The defendants challenged the admissibility of the evidence
under the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked probable
48
To determine
cause for the warrantless search and seizure.
whether the officer’s intrusion was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court applied an objective standard: “[W]ould
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the
49
action taken was appropriate?” An officer’s subjective good faith
or “inarticulate hunches” were insufficient for an investigatory
50
stop: “[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
51
Thus, investigatory stops based on
warrant that intrusion.”
52
reasonable suspicion and not on probable cause are permissible.
53
In Adams v. Williams, the Terry investigatory stop doctrine was
54
extended to automobile stops.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 21–22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
See id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Id. at 148.
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B. The Federal Pre-Whren Standard
The only relevant Supreme Court case to mention pretexts
before Whren was Abel v. United States.55 There, the FBI was
56
interested in connecting Abel with espionage. Lacking sufficient
evidence for such an arrest or search, the FBI notified the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that Abel was an
57
alien residing illegally in the United States. INS officers served
58
the defendant with a warrant for his arrest. After the arrest, INS
59
officers conducted a limited search of the premises. The FBI
conducted a more thorough search later in the day, during which
60
The defendant
critical evidence of espionage was discovered.
challenged the evidence gathered regarding espionage, claiming
that the government used an administrative warrant as a pretext to
61
search for evidence of espionage.
The Court acknowledged that it would not permit pretextual
searches: “Were this claim justified by the record, it would indeed
62
reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforcing officers.” The Court
further stated that “[t]he test [for a pretext] is whether the decision
to proceed administratively toward deportation was influenced by,
and was carried out for, a purpose of amassing evidence in the
63
prosecution for crime.” Because the INS officials acted in good
64
faith in the deportation arrest, the Court did not find a pretext.
Furthermore, the proper communications, coordination, and
65
procedures occurred between the FBI and the INS. Hence, Abel
stood for the proposition that searches by law enforcement officers
66
following standard procedures should not be considered pretexts.

55. 362 U.S. 217 (1960). Although the Supreme Court first mentioned
pretexts in United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), that case is no longer
relevant since Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) held that full warrantless
searches of an arrestee’s premises are no longer permissible. See LAFAVE, supra
note 4, § 1.4(e).
56. Abel, 362 U.S. at 221.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 223.
59. Id. at 223–24.
60. Id. at 224–25.
61. Id. at 225.
62. Id. at 226.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 228.
65. Id. at 229.
66. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1996); see also LAFAVE,
supra note 4, § 1.4(e).
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Abel left little guidance to the lower courts.67 As a result,
lower courts looked to four other Fourth Amendment cases that
68
addressed the subjective intent of law enforcement agents: Terry
69
70
v. Ohio (discussed above), United States v. Robinson, Scott v.
71
72
United States, and United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.
In Robinson, an officer knew that the defendant was driving
without a license because the defendant was the subject of a
73
The
previous investigation that took place four days earlier.
74
officer stopped and arrested the defendant. A search incident to
75
the arrest revealed the defendant’s possession of heroin.
Discussing the defendant’s challenge to the stop, the Court stated
in dicta that the officer’s subjective motive was not relevant
because the arrest was lawful and the search was not a departure of
76
established police practice.
Federal wiretapping laws require that federal agents minimize
77
In Scott, the defendant
the interception of communications.
challenged the legality of a search because the government officials
failed to make any effort to comply with the minimization
78
The Court claimed that Fourth Amendment
requirements.
analysis first undertakes “an objective assessment of an officer’s
79
actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.”
In this case, the government agents’ actions were reasonable
because they could not discriminate which phone calls to monitor
80
until hearing the calls.
Finally, in Villamonte-Marquez, a congressional statute with
historical roots to the First Congress was challenged for violating
81
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The
statute permits customs officials to board any vessel in the United

67. See Kaban, supra note 6, at 1311.
68. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709
(11th Cir. 1986); see also Kaban, supra note 6, at 1312.
69. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
70. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
71. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
72. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
73. 414 U.S. at 220.
74. Id. at 220–21.
75. Id. at 223.
76. Id. at 221 n.1.
77. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978).
78. Id. at 131–33.
79. Id. at 137.
80. Id. at 140.
81. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983).
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States at any time, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, for
inspection of documents.82 Officers boarded a sailboat to inspect its
83
A later
documentation and soon smelled burning marijuana.
84
search revealed 5800 pounds of marijuana. In response to the
defendants’ challenge of the search and seizure, the Court stated in
dicta that ulterior motives, like being tipped regarding narcotics
trafficking, did not deprive agents of their legal justification of
85
boarding the vessel for document inspection.
Based on these cases, ten circuits adopted an objective
standard: if an officer could have legally made the stop, then it was
86
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopted a
not pretextual.
reasonable officer standard: whether a reasonable officer following
normal police practice would have made the seizure in the absence
87
of illegitimate motivation. The Tenth Circuit had also adopted
the reasonable officer standard but later overruled it because “its
88
The court
application has been inconsistent and sporadic.”
recognized that the reasonable officer standard deprived state
legislators of “the task of determining what the traffic laws ought to
89
Holding the
be and how those laws ought to be enforced.”
reasonable officer standard “unworkable,” the Tenth Circuit
90
adopted the objective test.
C. The Objective Standard: Whren v. United States
Two police officers in Washington, D.C., were patrolling a
“high drug area” when they spotted a suspicious vehicle that they
91
Although the officers lacked
believed was carrying drugs.
probable cause regarding narcotics transportation, they observed
92
the truck turn without signaling and speed off. When the car
stopped at a light, one of the officers approached it and

82. Id. at 580.
83. Id. at 583.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 584 n.3; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
86. Kaban, supra note 6, at 1312.
87. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit did not answer
whether the reasonable officer standard would apply to probable-cause traffic
stops or only to investigatory stops. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708–09.
88. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995).
89. Id. at 788.
90. Id. at 787.
91. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
92. Id.
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immediately spotted narcotics in the car.93 He arrested the two
94
occupants. The defendants challenged the admissibility of the
evidence because the officers had neither probable cause nor
reasonable suspicion of illegal drug-dealing activity to make the
95
stop.
Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous court, claimed that
“[n]ot only have we never held, outside the context of inventory
search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the
96
contrary.” Subjective motivations do not factor into the probable
97
Thus,
cause Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.
pretextual searches and seizures are valid where there is probable
98
cause to make the initial stop. The Court recognized the concern
that pretexts may generate selective law enforcement but claimed
that selective law enforcement is illegal under the Equal Protection
99
Clause and not the Fourth Amendment.
In Whren, the Court finally addressed the issue of pretextual
searches and seizures for probable-cause automobile stops.
However, the Court has yet to address the pretext issue as it relates
100
to investigatory stops.
101

D. The Subjective Standard: State v. Ladson
Most states incorporate some sort of search-and-seizure
102
In many cases these
protection within their state constitutions.
103
provisions are similar, if not identical, to the Fourth Amendment.
104
Although states can
In a few cases, the language is different.
interpret provisions in their constitutions more broadly than similar

93. Id. at 809–10.
94. Id. at 809.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 812.
97. Id. at 813.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4(f).
101. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999).
102. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.H. CONST. art.
I, § 19; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
103. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 12.
104. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20.
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provisions under the Federal Constitution,105 almost all the states
106
The
have adopted the Whren objective standard for pretexts.
107
State of Washington is a notable exception.
The Washington Supreme Court adopted the subjective intent
108
standard in State v. Ladson. In Ladson, two police officers tailed
Richard Fogle’s car because Fogle was rumored to be involved in
109
The officers stopped Fogle for recently expired
drug dealing.
license plate tags and later found that his driver’s license was
110
After arresting Fogle, the officers turned their
suspended.
111
attention to Thomas Ladson, the passenger. The police searched
Ladson and his jacket, which was left inside the car, and they
112
The police arrested the
discovered a concealed weapon.
defendant and conducted a more thorough search, which revealed
113
The defendant challenged the legality of the search
marijuana.
and seizure because the stop was pretextual, a characterization the
114
police did not deny at trial.
The search-and-seizure provision in the Washington
Constitution places a greater emphasis on privacy than does the
115
The Ladson court held that all searches
U.S. Constitution.
require a warrant unless they fall within a narrow category of
116
exceptions. The court explained that “the reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an
exception to the warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop
117
does not justify a stop for criminal investigation.” The court held
that the actual reason for the stop must function as something more
118
Therefore, a
than a mere formal justification for the search.
105. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969); State v.
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986). But see Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759
(Fla. 1997) (holding that a conformity clause within the Florida Constitution
requires that search-and-seizure laws be identical to U.S. Supreme Court
holdings).
106. See People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638 (N.Y. 2001) (providing a thorough
review of pretexts in the fifty states).
107. See id. at 642 n.1.
108. State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842–43 (Wash. 1999).
109. Id. at 836.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 837.
116. Id. at 838.
117. Id. at 837–38.
118. See id. at 838–39.
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search or seizure may not expand beyond the rationale for the
exception,119 and thus pretextual searches and seizures violate the
120
Washington Constitution.
III. SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE IN ALASKA
A. General Search-and-Seizure Laws
The Alaska Constitution provides
unreasonable searches and seizures:

protection

from

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and
other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched,
121
and the persons or things to be seized.

In Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n v.
122
Municipality of Anchorage, the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that protection under this state constitutional provision “is stronger
than the federal protection because article I, section 14 [of the
Alaska Constitution] is textually broader than the Fourth
Amendment and the clause draws added strength from Alaska’s
123
This broader protection
express guarantee of privacy.”
encompases protections provided under the Privacy Provision of
124
The Anchorage Police court held that
article I, section 22.
constitutional concerns regarding unwarranted intrusion should be
addressed by solely focusing on section 14’s search-and-seizure
protections and stated that “in cases involving allegedly invalid
searches, we have recognized that the standard for determining
compliance with Alaska’s search-and-seizure clause is ‘inexorably
entwined’ with the standard of privacy established in article I,
125
Nonetheless, the greater privacy protection under
section 22.”
article I, section 14 has been used to challenge legal principles held
valid under the Fourth Amendment. For example, Alaska affords

119. Id. at 842.
120. Id. at 836.
121. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14.
122. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001) (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 550. The only textual difference between the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution is the phrase “and other
property.” See id.
124. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
125. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n, 24 P.3d at 550–51.
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greater search-and-seizure protection for automobiles under its
state constitution.126
Alaska also recognizes the federal exceptions to the warrant
127
requirement but places greater restrictions on the warrant
exceptions. Hence, Alaska recognizes, with significant restrictions,
the three categories of warrantless automobile stops: (1) a search of
a motor vehicle based on probable cause; (2) an investigatory stop;
and (3) an inventory search.
A warrantless search or seizure is lawful where the police have
“probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and
128
probable cause to believe that the person committed it.” Alaska
courts have explained that “[p]robable cause exists where ‘the facts
and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge, and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information, (are) sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
129
that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”
Investigatory stops of automobiles based on suspicious
130
circumstances are also permissible. The principal justification for
such stops is that police officers have a duty to make prompt
131
investigations of practical necessity. However, since these stops
lack probable cause, they are only permissible within a narrow
range of circumstances: (1) where the police officer has reasonable
132
suspicion that imminent public danger exists; (2) where serious
133
harm to person or property has recently occurred; or (3) where
an officer stops a potential witness near the scene of a recently
134
In addition, an officer must point to
reported serious crime.
specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational
135
inferences, reasonably warrant the investigatory stop.
126. See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 416 (Alaska 1979). Contra South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
127. See Schraff v. State, 544 P.3d 834, 840–41, 844–45 (Alaska 1975) (holding
that an officer’s search of a suspect’s car and wallet was not one of nine recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement).
128. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1971).
129. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–176 (1949)
(alteration and parenthesis in original).
130. Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46–47 (Alaska 1976)
131. Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964); Metzker v. State, 797 P.2d
1219, 1221 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
132. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46; Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1220.
133. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46; Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1220.
134. Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1221; Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1992).
135. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 45 (adopting the test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–
22 (1968)).
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Finally, inventory searches are permissible, but Alaska law
substantially restricts these searches and seizures.136 The only case
137
to address inventory searches of automobiles was State v. Daniel.
In Daniel, an officer conducted an inventory of an impounded car
138
and opened a briefcase that was left in the backseat. Inside the
briefcase, the officer found marijuana and an automatic pistol and
139
The court held that purely
charged the defendant accordingly.
routine, non-investigatory inventory searches for the purpose of
protecting property located within an impounded vehicle are
permissible; however opening closed, sealed, or locked containers
during such a search violates the protections of the Alaska
140
Constitution.
The Alaska courts have been equally restrictive in the context
141
of other inventory searches. In Zehrung v. State, an inventory
search during a booking revealed that the defendant carried in his
142
Since
wallet two stolen credits cards belonging to rape victims.
the defendant had already posted bail and was not going to be
incarcerated, the court held that the jailhouse inventory search was,
absent probable cause, an unreasonable governmental intrusion
143
In Reeves v. State,144
into the defendant’s personal freedom.
police performing a routine booking inventory search at a state jail
145
annex discovered a balloon containing an unknown substance.
The officers unwrapped the balloon, and one of the officers took its
contents to a police station where field testing revealed the
146
The court found that, even after an
presence of heroin.
individual’s arrest, privacy interests extend even to items within
closed or sealed containers, which cannot be opened for inventory
147
searches without a warrant, consent, or prior probable cause.

136. See Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 737 (Alaska 1979) (holding that a preincarceration inventory search “should be no more intensive than reasonably
necessary . . . .”).
137. 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979).
138. Id. at 410.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 417–18.
141. 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977).
142. Id. at 191–92.
143. Id. at 193.
144. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979).
145. Id. at 730.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 737–38.
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B. Relevant Pretext Case Law
Before Whren, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed pretexts
only in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The first pretextual
search-and-seizure case was McCoy v. State.148 In McCoy, a ticket
on Western Airlines had been purchased with a stolen credit
149
The defendant presented this ticket to the airlines at the
card.
150
At the police station, the
Anchorage airport and was arrested.
police searched the defendant without a warrant, and the search
151
The defendant moved to
discovered a package of cocaine.
suppress the narcotics evidence on the ground that the seach and
152
In its Fourth Amendment analysis, the
seizure was unlawful.
court stated that, although an arrest cannot serve as a mere pretext
for a search, a warrant is not required for a search wholly incident
153
The court went on to hold that the Alaska
to a vaild arrest.
Constitution did not require broader search-and-seizure protection
154
than the Fourth Amendment already required. The court stated
that “[w]here there is probable cause to arrest for a particular
crime of a type which can be evidenced by items concealed on the
155
Further, the
person there is little danger of a pretext arrest.”
court relied on policy in determining that “to require a warrant in
the circumstances of this case would be a futile gesture which could
hamstring legitimate police action without offering meaningful
156
protection to the arrestee.”
Justice Rabinowitz strongly dissented from the majority
opinion, arguing for greater protection under the Alaska
157
Constitution. He contended that warrantless searches are limited
by the reason for the exception: “I read Alaska’s Constitution as
requiring that the intensity of all warrantless searches of the person
be limited by the necessity, or exigency, which provides the basis
158
Thus searches should not be permissible
for the exception.”
when the “rationale for the warrantless intrusion no longer
159
exists.” He encouraged his colleagues to establish “a rule that the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 142–43 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 142.
Id.
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intensity of a warrantless search should be limited to the purpose
which justifies its exception.”160 However, the court refused to
161
adopt Justice Rabinowitz’s position.
162
Four years later, in Schraff v. State, the Alaska Supreme
Court again warned against pretextual searches under the Fourth
163
Yet, the court refused to accept Justice
Amendment.
Rabinowitz’s legal opinion that the warrant exceptions’ rationale
“provide[s] the theoretical and practical justification for departure
from the constitutional requirement [of a warrant] . . . [and
therefore] these same justifications provide relevant criteria for
delineation of the permissible degree of intensity of a warrantless
164
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”
In two cases in 1978, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected
arguments that searches were impermissible pretexts where the
165
facts supported a valid basis for the search. In one of those cases,
Brown v. State, an officer responding to an armed robbery
166
witnessed a speeding vehicle traveling in the opposite direction.
The vehicle failed to signal when making a left turn and did not
167
The officer stopped the vehicle for traffic
stop at a stop sign.
violations, and the defendant, who matched the suspect’s
description, bolted from his car and was apprehended by the
168
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found
officer.
within his car because he claimed the traffic stop was a pretext,
although the facts never mentioned anything regarding the officer’s
169
subjective intent. Nevertheless, the court found that “there was
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that
Brown’s vehicle was stopped for a violation of traffic regulations,
170
and that this was not a pretext stop.”

160. Id. at 143.
161. Id. at 133, 139 (majority opinion expressing disagreement with their
dissenting justices and refusing to apply a broader protection under the Alaska
Constitution).
162. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
163. See id. at 842.
164. Id. at 849 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
165. Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1978); Brown v. State, 580 P.2d
1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978) (per curiam).
166. Brown, 580 P.2d at 1175.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1176.
170. Id.
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The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed the pretext issue in
Townsel v. State.171 In Townsel, an officer responding to an armed
robbery witnessed a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction and
in violation of numerous traffic regulations: the driver was
speeding and the vehicle had a broken headlight, a broken taillight,
172
an obscured driver’s window, and an obscured license plate. The
officer stopped the car and asked the defendant to exit the
173
vehicle. When the defendant reached for his rifle in the backseat,
174
the officer drew his own weapon, and the defendant fled on foot.
Since the officer was unable to catch the defendant, the police
searched the contents of the car, found a driver’s license, obtained
a search warrant for the defendant’s residence, and arrested the
175
defendant. At trial, the defendant claimed that the stop was an
176
invalid pretextual stop. The court found that because the officer
indicated that he would have made the traffic stop regardless of his
177
investigation of the robbery, the stop was not a pretext.
The last case before Whren to address the subjective intent of
178
a police officer was Beauvois v. State. In Beauvois, the defendant
179
robbed a 7-Eleven and fled on foot towards a campground. Once
there, the defendant entered his friend’s car, and they started
180
driving out of the campground. Because there was only one road
out and it was 3:00 a.m., an officer responding to the robbery,
believing that anyone awake in the area could reasonably be a
potential witness, decided to stop all moving vehicles he
181
After the officer stopped the car carrying the
encountered.
182
defendant, one of the passengers jumped out. The officer soon
183
learned that the car was stolen and detained the driver. Finally,
the officer noticed someone hiding under a blanket in the
184
backseat. He removed the blanket and discovered the defendant,

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

763 P.2d 1353 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 1119–20.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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who matched the robber’s description.185 The 7-Eleven clerk
186
arrived at the scene and identified the defendant as the robber.
Charged with robbery, the defendant argued at trial that the stop
was an illegal seizure, but he did not specifically argue that it was
187
an illegal pretext.
The court found that the stop was a legal investigatory stop
since officers are permitted to reasonably stop potential witnesses
188
near the scene of a recently reported crime. In dicta, the court
stated that “[the officer’s] subjective intent when he stopped the
car is irrelevant. The test is whether, under the facts known to the
police officer, the stop of the car was objectively justified. . . . ‘This
test . . . is purely objective and thus there is no requirement that an
189
actual suspicion by the officer be shown.’” However, this holding
does not demonstrate adoption of the objective test for pretexts,
190
but rather only for Terry investigatory stops. The latter objective
test was meant to protect individuals from detention based solely
191
on an officer’s “inarticulate hunches,” thereby precluding the
good-faith exception rule for investigatory stops.
Thus, in
Beauvois, the court was neither addressing the pretext issue nor
establishing the irrelevance of an officer’s “bad faith” subjective
intent for an investigatory stop.
C. Six Recent Cases: Hamilton, Way, Nease, and Others
Since Whren was decided, six cases have addressed the
constitutionality of pretextual searches and seizures under the
Alaska Constitution. However, in all six cases, the Alaska Court of
Appeals has avoided addressing the pretext issue under the state
constitution. In addition, in Hamilton v. State and Way v. State the
192
A year later,
court applied the Whren objective standard.
however, in Nease v. State, the court applied the reasonable officer
193
Although the reasonable officer standard seems to
standard.
have prevailed, the court still has failed to conduct a thorough
analysis of the pretext issue under the Alaska Constitution.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1121.
189. Id., n.1 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(a) (2d
ed. 1987)) (emphasis in original).
190. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
191. See id.
192. Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 764–65 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Way v.
State, 100 P.3d 902, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
193. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
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In Hamilton, the defendant entered a victim’s home in the
middle of the night and stabbed him twenty-eight times.194 An
officer arriving at the scene of the crime witnessed two cars
195
traveling away. Since it was approximately 2:30 a.m., the officer
wanted to record the license plate number of one of the cars for
later questioning to determine if the driver was a potential witness
196
to the crime. The officer radioed for a police car behind him to
197
However, the
record the license plate number of the sedan.
license plate was obscured by snow in violation of Alaska traffic
198
The officer stopped the car to talk to the driver.199 Upon
law.
reaching the driver’s window, the officer noticed that the driver’s
200
hands were covered in blood. The officer then arrested him and
a subsequent search of the car revealed evidence linking the
201
defendant to the murder. The defendant challenged the legality
202
of the stop.
In the first part of its analysis, the court found that the officer
had probable cause to stop Hamilton because of his traffic
203
violation. The court then relied on Beauvois in its analysis of the
legality of the stop, stating that an investigatory stop “hinges on an
objective test . . . . The officers’ subjective theories as to why the
204
The court expanded upon this
stop was proper are irrelevant.”
rule by stating that “the legality of the traffic stop [not just an
investigatory stop] is determined by an objective assessment of the
205
facts known to the officers at the time they conducted the stop.”
Finally, the court concluded that it did not need to accept or reject
Whren as a matter of Alaska constitutional law because “the police
were justified in stopping Hamilton’s car as part of their
206
investigation.” In the second part of the analysis, the court found
that the stop was a permissible investigatory stop for the purpose of

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 762–63.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766.
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questioning potential witnesses near the scene of a recently
committed serious crime.207
In Way v. State, an informant had tipped officers that the
208
defendant’s van contained a methamphetamine lab. Upon seeing
a similar van drive by, an officer tried to see the van’s license plate,
209
The officer radioed for another
but the plate was obscured.
trooper to stop the van for the license plate violation and to
210
Upon approaching the
determine if the van belonged to Way.
van, the police smelled iodine and saw a small bag of white
211
powder. After getting a search warrant, the officers searched the
212
vehicle. The defendant claimed that the stop was illegal because
it was a pretext to determine whether the van had a
213
methamphetamine lab.
The court determined that it need not adopt either Whren or
Ladson as a matter of Alaska constitutional law because the stop
214
was not pretextual. It held that the officers had probable cause to
215
Furthermore, in
stop the vehicle for illegal license plates.
defining the pretext standard, the court provided a very narrow
example of a pretextual search, describing a scenario in which
police follow a suspect and wait until the suspect commits a traffic
216
violation.
Recently, the court addressed pretextual stops in Nease v.
State. In Nease, a police officer saw a red pickup truck speeding at
217
When the
seventy-five miles per hour in snowy conditions.
officer caught up to the truck, the truck was parked, and its owner,
Nease, who could barely walk due to intoxication, claimed that he
218
The officer then warned Nease that the
had not been driving.
219
next time Nease drove drunk, the officer was going to catch him.
207. Id. at 767.
208. Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 904.
215. Id. at 904–05.
216. Id. at 905 (“[T]he classic pretext search is one where the police follow a
suspect based on the theory . . . that the suspect will certainly commit a traffic
violation within a short period of time which will give the police the opportunity
to stop the suspect for the traffic violation and then search the suspect and the
vehicle.”).
217. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1146 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Some days later, the officer noticed the truck parked at a local
bar.220 An hour later, the officer noticed the truck again at a local
221
restaurant. When Nease pulled out of the parking lot, the officer
222
followed, suspecting that Nease was driving while intoxicated.
The officer at first noticed no problems with Nease’s driving, but
when he noticed that one of Nease’s brake lights did not work, he
223
pulled Nease over. The officer then determined that Nease was
224
The defendant challenged the
intoxicated and arrested him.
validity of the traffic stop, arguing that it was used as a pretext to
225
determine if he had been driving while intoxicated. The district
226
court agreed.
The Alaska Court of Appeals, however, held that the stop was
227
legal. It found that the officer had probable cause to stop Nease
228
The court further
for violation of a minor traffic regulation.
determined that it need not address if the Whren or Ladson
standards applied under the Alaska Constitution because the stop
did not fall within the pretext doctrine, as defined under the Fourth
229
Amendment. In reaching its conclusion, the court cited LaFave’s
Search and Seizure, stating that “the fact that a police officer may
have an ulterior motive for enforcing the law is irrelevant for
Fourth Amendment purposes—even under the doctrine of pretext
searches—unless the defendant proves that this ulterior motive
230
prompted the officer to depart from reasonable police practices.”
Furthermore, “[e]ven if [the court] were to subscribe to the
doctrine of ‘pretext stops,’ the question would be whether Nease
proved that Officer Torok departed from reasonable police
practice when he decided to stop Nease because of the non231
The court concluded that the officer
functioning brake light.”
had probable cause for the stop and that the stop was not a
departure from reasonable police practice; therefore, the stop was
232
legal.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1150.
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Since Nease, the court of appeals has addressed three cases
that raised pretext claims under the Alaska Constitution: Olson v.
233
234
235
State, Grohs v. State, and Marley v. State. Each of these cases
only further supported and substantiated the Nease decision. The
court ruled that to have a valid pretext claim under the Fourth
Amendment, the defendants must show both that an ulterior
motive existed and that departure from reasonable police practice
236
was prompted by that motive.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Alaska Court of Appeals’ Failure to Address the Issue of
Pretexts Under the Alaska Constitution
Before Whren, Alaska courts had inoccuously avoided
addressing the pretext issue in both Brown and Townsel in that,in
those cases, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
237
establish that the officer did not act with improper motivation.
Thus, the courts’ refusal to overturn the lower courts’ findings was
238
not erroneous. Likewise, Hamilton provided a poor opportunity
to address the pretext question because the officer had no
239
240
improper motive —the stop was a valid investigatory stop. The
subjective motivation of the officer was to make a stop for the
purpose of questioning potential witnesses about a serious crime
241
Thus, the officer had no illegal
recently committed nearby.
motivation.
However, starting with Way, the court of appeals has
erroneously avoided the pretext question under the Alaska
Constitution. In Way, the court narrowly redefined pretexts to
include only those cases where the police follow a suspect and wait
242
No prior decisions have
until he commits a traffic violation.
defined pretexts so narrowly. As defined earlier, a pretextual
search or seizure occurs when the police use a legal justification to
233. No. A-8595, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005).
234. 118 P.3d 1080 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
235. No. A-9285, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80 (Alaska Ct. App. May 3, 2006).
236. Olson, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69, at *7–8; Grohs, 118 P.3d at 1082;
Marley, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80, at *11.
237. See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978); Townsel v. State,
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
238. See Brown, 580 P.2d at 1176; Townsel, 763 P.2d at 1355.
239. See Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 766 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
240. Id. at 767.
241. See id. at 766.
242. See Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 905 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
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make a stop in order to conduct a search for an unrelated crime for
which they do not have the probable cause or the reasonable
243
suspicion necessary to support a stop. Rather than focusing on:
(1) whether the officer had probable cause to stop Way for an
investigation of a possible methamphetamine lab or (2) whether
the officer’s subjective intent was to search Way’s van for a lab, the
244
court redefined pretexts to avoid addressing the question.
In Nease, the court of appeals committed an even greater error
in finding that the case did not factually fall within the doctrine of
245
The facts of the case fell squarely within the
pretextual stops.
definition of pretexts that the court developed a year earlier in
Way. Nonetheless, the court provided no justification for why the
pretext definition in Way was not applicable. In addition, the court
failed to provide adequate justification for its dismissal of the
246
pretext question under state law. The court claimed that the facts
failed to fall within the pretext doctrine, as defined under federal
law, and did not address the question under the Alaska
247
Constitution.
In conclusion, the Alaska Court of Appeals should no longer
avoid the pretext issue under the state’s constitution. The focus
should be whether an officer had an ulterior motive for the stop. If
an ulterior motive exists, the court should do a thorough analysis of
the pretext doctrine under the Alaska Constitution.
B. The Implicit Adoption of the Reasonable Officer Standard by
the Alaska Court of Appeals
The current Alaska law regarding pretexts is based on
improper analyses. In Beauvois, the court, in dicta, misinterpreted
Terry and stated that an objective standard prevails in investigatory
248
In Terry, the Supreme Court adopted an objective test
stops.
solely as a means to protect individuals from police harassment by
249
The Court
requiring some objective rationale for the stop.
indicated that an officer’s subjective “good faith” alone would not
warrant these intrusions, thereby excluding Terry stops from the
250
good-faith exception to illegal searches and seizures. In fact, the
243. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
244. See Way, 100 P.3d at 905.
245. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148–49 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
246. Id. at 1148.
247. Id. at 1148–50.
248. Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121–22 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); see
also supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
249. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
250. See id.
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U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed whether “bad faith”
subjective motivation is permissible for investigatory stops.251
Although the Beauvois court was neither addressing the issue of
pretext nor establishing precedent, this misinterpretation has been
relied upon in later cases.
For example, in Hamilton and Way, the Alaska Court of
Appeals appears to have adopted the objectective standard by
default and without applying the appropriate analysis under the
Alaska Constiutiton. In Hamilton, the court of appeals directly
252
relied on Beauvois. The court held that Beauvois announced the
position that the legality of an investigatory stop relies on an
objective test and that the subjective intent of the officer plays no
253
role. The court then applied the objective test to probable-cause
254
Although investigatory stops and probable-cause stops
stops.
have been considered separate categories of warrantless
exceptions, the Hamilton court conflated these constitutionally
255
protected categories without providing any justification. As such,
the Hamilton court implicitly applied the Whren standard when it
held that the officer’s subjective intent plays no role in probable256
cause traffic stops. In Way, the court reconfirmed, implicitly, the
257
adoption of the Whren standard.
In Nease, the court of appeals erroneously adopted the
reasonable officer standard through an improper analysis of federal
law.
Although the pretext issue was dismissed, the court
investigated which standard would be appropriate had the pretext
258
In determining which standard would
issue been addressed.
prevail for pretextual stops, the court did not rely on either Whren
259
or Ladson, but turned to LaFave’s Search and Seizure treatise.
However, instead of using the 2004 version of that treatise, the
court used the 1996 version, which was published before the Whren
260
decision. The court cited the sections of LaFave that refer to the

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4(f).
Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 765 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 904–05 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
See Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148–49 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
Id.
See id. at 1148 n.16; compare 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996)
(predating Whren), with LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4(f) (reflecting the Whren
standard.)
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United States Supreme Court opinions of Abel, Scott, and other
pre-Whren cases.261 In fact, the Nease court relied on LaFave’s
discussion of Abel to determine that pretextual searches and
seizures do not occur where there is no departure from reasonable
262
police practice. Since Whren has definitively addressed this issue
263
and rejected the reasonable officer standard, the focus on Abel’s
potential application is misplaced. Nonetheless, like the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have in the past, the court of appeals
264
implicitly
adopted
the
reasonable
officer
standard.
265
266
267
Unfortunately, Olson, Grohs, and Marley served only to
reconfirm the Nease decision.
In conclusion, the current applicable law on the pretext
doctrine in Alaska has been developed by improper legal analysis.
In the post-Whren era, the court indirectly adopted the objective
standard, but, during the last two years, it has established a
reasonable officer standard. The courts should discard this
improper standard and finally address the pretext doctrine with a
thorough and proper analysis under the Alaska Constitution.
C. Pretext Analysis Under the Alaska Constitution
Alaska courts have investigated the pretext question under the
Fourth Amendment but have not determined whether Alaska’s
268
state constitution requires a different standard. Because this issue
has been raised and is of great significance, the Alaska courts
should determine the validity of pretexts under article I, section 14
of the Alaska Constitution.
When the Alaska courts do address this issue, they should
conduct their own thorough analysis under the Alaska Constitution
and not simply adopt the federal standard as there are significant
differences between Alaska’s search-and-seizure laws and those of
the federal government. First, article I, section 14 provides broader

261. See Nease, 105 P.3d at 1148–49; LAFAVE, supra note 260, § 1.4(e).
262. Nease, 105 P.3d at 1148–49; see also LAFAVE, supra note 260, § 1.4(e).
263. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996).
264. See Nease, 105 P.3d at 1149.
265. See Olson v. State, No. A-8595, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69, at *7–8
(Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005).
266. See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
267. See Marley v. State, No. A-9285, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80, at *11
(Alaska Ct. App. May 3, 2006).
268. See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978); Clark v. State, 574
P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1978); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971);
Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
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protection than do the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.269
Second, article I, section 14 specifically provides a higher degree of
270
For example, in South
privacy protection within one’s car.
Dakota v. Opperman, the Supreme Court held that the lower
expectation of privacy within one’s vehicle permits broad inventory
271
The Alaska Supreme Court came to a different
searches.
272
conclusion, allowing only minimal inventory searches of vehicles.
273
Finally, the warrant exceptions in Alaska are more restrictive.
Thus, the Alaska courts should do a thorough analysis of pretextual
search-and-seizure law under the Alaska Constitution.
In Whren, the Supreme Court recognized the prevalence of
274
objective factors in a Fourth Amendment analysis. The adoption
of the objective standard for pretexts was a natural extension of its
275
Likewise, any analysis of pretexts under the
prior holdings.
Alaska Constitution should rely on anaolgous authority from other
search-and-seizure contexts.
Although the Alaska Constitution provides broader privacy
276
protection than does the Fourth Amendment, it does not
necessitate the illegality of pretext stops. The broader privacy
protection under the Alaska Constitution is not unlimited: “In such
circumstances [where there is little danger of a pretext] the
individual’s right of privacy must give way to the public need to
277
As a result, in warrantless search-andinvestigate the crime.”
seizure cases, the broader privacy protection has applied greater

269. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage,
24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001).
270. See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 416 (Alaska 1979) (holding that search of
closed containers within a car is not permitted in an inventory search due to the
individual’s privacy expectation). But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977) (prohibiting searches of closed containers in a car during a search after
arrest, but not an inventory search), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1991). Contra New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting searches
of closed containers in an immediate post-arrest search).
271. 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976).
272. See Daniel, 589 P.2d at 416–17.
273. See supra Part III.A.
274. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996).
275. Id.
276. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage,
24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001).
277. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 139 (Alaska 1971).
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restrictions in two circumstances: in limiting the scope of a search
or seizure and in narrowly construing warrant exceptions.278
Pretexts deal with neither category. First, a pretext is defined
in terms of the subjective motivation for the search and not the
scope of that search. For example, an officer acting on an
impermissible subjective motivation for a search must still conform
to the standard scope of that search unless probable cause arises
279
that permits a broader scope. Second, pretexts do not implicate
any warrant exception other than that which justified the initial
stop. The objective validity of a pretext under the initial warrant
exception is not at issue, rather the subjective motivation is what
makes pretexts problematic.
Alaska courts have, however, interpreted the Alaska
Constitution as it applies in other seach-and-seizure contexts, and
have tended to shy away from subjective standards. Warrant
exceptions, for example, under both Alaska and federal law, are
based on generally-applicable, objective policy rationales. For
example, as discussed earlier, a Terry investigatory stop is
permissible, without a warrant, in order to ensure public safety. It
is established federal law under Whren that when the factual
predicates for a warrant exception exist, a search or seizure is valid
without further inquiry into whether the motivation for the search
280
is aligned with the policy underlying the exception. Disregard for
the subjective motivation of a search or seizure is, indeed, the sine
qua non of the objective standard.
The Alaska Supreme Court followed the objective standard in
McCoy and Schraff, cases concerning the permissible scope of
warrantless searches and seizures. The court twice declined to
adopt the reasoning of Justice Rabinowitz, who advocated a
281
As Justice
subjective approach in his dissents to both cases.
Rabinowitz articulated his position in Schraff: “[The warrant
exceptions’ rationale] provide[s] the theoretical and practical
justification for departure from the constitutional requirement [of a

278. Prior discussion of the inventory exception illustrates greater restrictions
on the scope of searches, whereas discussion of probable-cause and investigatory
stops illustrates greater restrictions on the attainment of a warrant exception.
279. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–63 (1981) (examining the scope
of vehicle searches after arrest). This case illustrates that the scope of a search of
an automobile is limited.
280. The Washington Supreme Court held the opposite in Ladson, requiring
that the motivation of the search align with the underlying policy. See State v.
Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842–43 (Wash. 1999). The Ladson case is described supra at
Part II.D.
281. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.
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warrant] . . . [and further] these same justifications provide relevant
criteria for delineation of the permissible degree of intensity of a
282
warrantless search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”
Indeed, focus on alignment of the motivation for a search and the
policy underlying the exception validating that search was the
touchstone of Justice Rabinowitz’s analysis. Given the court’s
reluctance to adopt subjective considerations in McCoy and Schraff
with respect to the valid scope of warrantless searches, it follows
that subjective considerations would be similarly irrelevant in the
context of pretextual searches.
Nor does an analysis of the privacy-rights implications of
searches and seizures support adoption of a subjective standard.
Indeed, the court in McCoy declined to adopt a subjective
standard, stating that “to require a warrant in the circumstances of
this case would be a futile gesture which could hamstring legitimate
police action without offering meaningful protection to the
283
arrestee.” Thus, an issue of great concern for the court should be
whether the subjective test offers meaningful protection to a
detainee potentially subjected to a pretextual search. It does not.
As discussed, it is beyond dispute that probable-cause traffic stops
are valid. A subjective test would do little to increase privacy
because it is unworkable—police, aware of the test, could simply
misrepresent their subjective motivation. Indeed, an attempt to
neutralize misrepresentation, such as through a policy that all
traffic law violators be stopped, would invade the privacy of even
more Alaskans. Nor would a subjective test provide additional
privacy protections to vulnerable groups because the Equal
Protection Clause already protects them from discriminatory police
284
behavior.
Furthermore, the subjective test would hamstring legitimate
police action. Not only would officers be required to indicate their
subjective motives for all stops, but police officers would be
deterred from addressing criminal behavior that is uncovered when
they make a routine traffic stop, thereby facilitating criminal
activity. Even if officers were acting properly to prevent or impede
282. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 849 (Alaska 1975) (Rabinowitz, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
283. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971).
284. The Alaska Constitution confirms this result, as its equal protection
language is even broader than that of the U.S. Constitution. Compare ALASKA
CONST. art I, § 1 (“all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities,
and protection under the law”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”).
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criminal activity, a subjective standard would invite substantial post
hoc litigation. Finally, the subjective standard would produce a
chilling effect by discouraging police officers from following good
police intuition. Consequently, following the policy rationale from
McCoy, the subjective test is not preferable.
Neither the reasonable officer standard nor a modified version
of it should be adopted under the Alaska Constitution. No state
follows the reasonable officer standard, and only two circuits have
285
found the standard to be valid. Even then, the Eleventh Circuit
286
questioned the standard’s application to probable-cause stops. In
fact, the Tenth Circuit had found its application entirely
287
In addition, it is difficult to establish who the
untenable.
288
reasonable officer is or how reasonable police practice is defined,
whether the reasonable officer or practice is reasonable for the
entire State of Alaska, reasonable for the local community, or
reasonable for that particular officer based on his or her history.
Another problem with the reasonable officer standard is its
potential to violate separation of powers within the Alaska
Constitution. The reasonable officer standard allows the courts to
definitively determine which traffic laws an officer should or should
not enforce under the circumstances. This judicial determination
trenches on the executive branch’s power to determine when and
how to enforce the law. Finally, like the subjective standard, the
reasonable officer standard does not afford the individual any
greater level of protection.
In conclusion, the proper and thorough analysis of the Alaska
Constitution supports an interpretation that pretextual searches
and seizures should follow the objective standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Although most of the court systems in the nation have
definitively addressed the issue of pretextual searches and seizures,
the Alaska courts have actively avoided addressing the issue.
Other than Washington, all the court systems that have addressed
289
the issue of pretexts have adopted the objective standard.
However, Alaska has indirectly and through improper legal
analysis adopted a reasonable officer standard. In the interest of
justice, it is imperative that Alaska finally address the pretext issue

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995).
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 106–08.
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under a thorough, proper legal analysis. Such an analysis would
reveal that the Alaska Constitution supports the objective standard
and that neither the reasonable officer standard nor the subjective
standard is supported under the constitution’s greater protection
for privacy.

